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Abstract
Stochastic random phenomena considered in von Neumann – Morgenstern util-
ity theory constitute only a part of all possible random phenomena (Kolmogorov
(1986)). We show that any sequence of observed consequences generates a cor-
responding sequence of frequency distributions, which in general does not have
a single limit point but a non-empty closed limit set in the space of finitely
additive probabilities. This approach to randomness allows to generalize the
expected utility theory in order to cover decision problems under nonstochas-
tic random events. We derive the maxmin expected utility representation for
preferences over closed sets of probability measures. The derivation is based
on the axiom of preference for stochastic risk, i.e. the decision maker wishes
to reduce a set of probability distributions to a single one. This complements
Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) consideration of the maxmin expected utility
rule with objective treatment of multiple priors.
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1. Introduction
The expected utility theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) con-
siders situations of objective risk relying on the frequentist notion of probability.
Namely, the probability of an event is defined as its relative frequency in a large
number of trials.5
The problem arises when event’s relative frequency do not tend to a limit
(Borel (1956)). In Kolmogorov (1986) we read “Speaking of randomness in the
ordinary sense of this word, we mean those phenomena in which we do not find
regularities allowing us to predict their behavior. Generally speaking, there are
no reasons to assume that random in this sense phenomena are subject to some10
probabilistic laws. Hence, it is necessary to distinguish between randomness in
this broad sense and stochastic randomness (which is the subject of probability
theory)”. We shall say that random in a broad sense phenomena is nonstochastic
if it is not “the subject of probability theory”.
The problem of revealing regularities of nonstochastic phenomena, as well as15
corresponding decision rules, becomes more and more important nowadays. In
particular, this is true for complex social and economic systems, e.g. financial
markets (Lux (1998); Chian et al. (2006); Miller and Ratti (2009); Ivanenko and
Pasichnichenko (2014)).
Some non-probabilistic mathematical formalism has been used for these pur-20
poses (see for example, Dubois and Prade (1989)). However, we shall use the
extension of the standard notions of probability theory given by the theory
of statistical regularities (Ivanenko (2010); Ivanenko and Labkovsky (2015)).
Namely, every mass phenomenon (random or deterministic) is characterized by
its statistical regularity, i.e. a weak* closed set of finitely additive probability25
distributions. The statistical regularity of a stochastic phenomenon is a single-
ton.
This approach to randomness makes it possible to extend the domain of the
expected utility theory to cover decision problems under nonstochastic random
events. This paper proposes an axiomatic foundation of the maxmin expected30
2
utility decision rule in the statistical regularities framework.
Closed sets of probability measures are already being used in decision the-
ory yet not in the sense of laws, i.e. regularities, of random phenomena. For
instance, families of a priori distributions result from axioms of rational choice
(Ivanenko and Labkovsky (1986); Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989); Maccheroni35
et al. (2006); Chateauneuf and Faro (2009); Pasichnichenko (2016)). In partic-
ular, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) assume that the decision maker has a set of
priors, and each decision is valuated according to its minimal expected utility.
While the family of distributions in their model is usually considered as subjec-
tive, we offer a natural frequentist interpretation of such uncertainty situations.40
Jaffray (1989) studied decision situations, in which a unique true probability is
known up to a set of measures. On the contrary, it is impossible to distinguish
a unique true probability in a statistical regularity.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we derive the sta-
tistical regularities of mass phenomena. Then Section 3 states the main result.45
Finally, Section 4 provides summary and conclusions.
2. Statistical regularities
Suppose X is a nonempty set, Σ is an algebra of subsets of X, and XN is
the set of all sequences that take values in X.
Definition 1. Two sequences x¯(1), x¯(2) ∈ XN are called statistically equivalent
(S-equivalent) if for any m ∈ N and any bounded measurable functions γi : X →
R (i = 1,m) the sequences y¯(1) and y¯(2) have the same set of limit points (in
Rm), where γ = (γ1, . . . , γm) and
y(k)n =
1
n
n∑
i=1
γ
(
x
(k)
i
)
for all n ∈ N and k ∈ {1, 2}.50
In other words, S-equivalent sequences are indistinguishable with respect to
a limiting average. For the next definition, consider the partition of XN into
equivalence classes.
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Definition 2. A class A of S-equivalent sequences is called a simple mass phe-
nomenon.55
Let P be the set of all finitely additive probability measures on Σ endowed
with the weak* topology. Recall that a base of the topology consists of sets
{
p ∈ P : ∣∣∫ fi(x) dp− ∫ fi(x) dp0∣∣ < ε, i = 1, n} ,
where fi : X → R are bounded measurable functions, p0 ∈ P, ε > 0, and n ∈ N.
To each x¯ ∈ XN assign the sequence p¯ of measures pn ∈ P defined by
pn(A) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1A(xi) (1)
for all A ∈ Σ, where 1A is the indicator of a set A. Equivalently, pn is the
frequency distribution of the number of hits in the sets A ∈ Σ of the first
n terms of the sequence x¯. Since P is a compact space, we know that the
sequence p¯ has a non-empty closed set of limit points.60
Definition 3. The set of limit points of the sequence p¯ is called the statistical
regularity of the sequence x¯ and is denoted by P (x¯).
In general, P (x¯) is not a singleton even for finite X as it was shown by
Zorich et al. (2000). The following theorem justifies Definition 3.
Theorem 1.65
1. Suppose x¯ ∈ XN, m ∈ N, γi : X → R (i = 1,m) is a bounded measurable
mapping, and
yn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
γ (xi)
for all n ∈ N, where γ = (γ1, . . . , γm). Then the set of limit points of the
sequence y¯ coincides with
{∫
γ(x) dp : p ∈ P (x¯)} .
2. Two sequences x¯(1), x¯(2) ∈ XN are S-equivalent if and only if P (x¯(1)) =
P
(
x¯(2)
)
.
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In other words, the statistical regularity P (x¯) contains all information about
the limiting average for any characteristic γ. The proof of Theorem 1 is in
Appendix A. Statement 2 allows the following definition.70
Definition 4. The set P (x¯) is called a statistical regularity of a simple mass
phenomenon A if x¯ ∈ A.
The connection between the notions introduced above and probabilistic no-
tions follows directly from the strong law of large numbers (Lemma 1).
Lemma 1. Suppose X is a finite set, µ is a probability distribution on X, and75
{ξn} is a sequence of independent random elements taking values in X with the
distribution µ. Then with probability 1 the statistical regularity P ({ξn}) consists
of the only element µ.
Thus, if X is finite, then the regularity of a stochastic phenomenon is a
singleton.80
Note that the regularity of a sequence is concentrated on a countable subset
of X. A more general notion of a mass phenomenon is derived using sampling
nets (Ivanenko and Labkovsky (2015)).
Definition 5. A function ϕ from a directed set Λ to the sampling space X∞ =⋃∞
n=1X
n is called a sampling net in X.85
First, generalize the notion of S-equivalence and define a (non-simple) mass
phenomenon as a class of S-equivalent sampling nets. Namely, two sampling
nets ϕ(1) and ϕ(2) in X, such that
ϕ
(k)
λ =
(
x
(k)
λ1 , . . . , x
(k)
λn
(k)
λ
)
for all λ ∈ Λ and k ∈ {1, 2}, are called statistically equivalent if the nets y(1)
and y(2) defined by
y
(k)
λ =
1
n
(k)
λ
n
(k)
λ∑
i=1
γ
(
x
(k)
λi
)
(2)
have the same set of limit points. Then define the statistical regularity of a
sampling net ϕ as the set of limit points of the net p : Λ → P, where pλ is the
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frequency distribution of the sample ϕλ = (xλ1, . . . , xλnλ) defined by
pλ(A) =
1
nλ
nλ∑
i=1
1A(xλi)
for all A ∈ Σ.
For example, let the directed set be the set R+ of non-negative real numbers.
Then the number pt(A) could be interpreted as the frequency of the number of
hits in A of the observations (xt1, . . . , xtnt) that are performed at time t ∈ R+.
Theorem 1 remains true (Ivanenko and Labkovsky (2015)) if we replace90
sequences with sampling nets and define a net y by an equation similar to (2).
Moreover, the following is also true: if P is a non-empty closed subset of the
space P, then P is a statistical regularity of some sampling net in X. In other
words, every non-empty closed set of finitely additive probabilities on (X,Σ) can
be interpreted as a set of limit points related to some sampling net. The proof95
stems from the fact that the set of all simple probability measures with rational
values is dense in P. This consideration leads to the following definition.
Definition 6. A set P ⊆ P is a regularity on X if it is nonempty and closed.
To sum up, statistical regularities provide an extension of probability the-
ory to statistically unstable random phenomena. An arbitrary random mass100
phenomenon is characterized by a weak* closed set of probability distributions,
generally not a singleton. The approach is also appropriate for deterministic
phenomena if we are interested in their average characteristics.
3. Nonstochastic risk
A situation of nonstochastic risk is a decision-making situation such that105
the outcome of each decision is described by a regularity on the set X of conse-
quences.
Let R be the set of all regularities on X. We identify a probability measure p
with the singleton {p} and thereby consider P as a subset ofR. For all α ∈ [0, 1],
let the convex combination of regularities P ∈ R and q ∈ P be defined by
αP + (1− α) q = {αp+ (1− α) q : p ∈ P} , (3)
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while convex combinations in P are performed pointwise. The following lemma
shows that the set R is closed under operation (3).
Lemma 2. For all P ∈ R, q ∈ P and α ∈ [0, 1], the set αP + (1− α) q is a110
regularity on X.
Proof. According to Definition 6 we must prove that αP + (1− α) q is closed.
The case α = 0 is trivial. Otherwise, consider the mapping pi : P → P defined
by
pi (p) = αp+ (1− α) q
for all p ∈ P. We shall prove that it is continuous. We claim that for any
p, p0 ∈ P, ε > 0, and any bounded measurable function f : X → R the inequality∣∣∫ f(x) dp− ∫ f(x) dp0∣∣ < εα
implies ∣∣∫ f(x) dpi(p)− ∫ f(x) dpi(p0)∣∣ < ε.
Indeed,∣∣∫ f(x) d (αp+ (1− α)q)− ∫ f(x) d (αp0 + (1− α)q)∣∣
= α
∣∣∫ f(x) dp− ∫ f(x) dp0∣∣ < ε.
Thus, for any neighborhood A of the point pi(p0) there is a neighborhood of the
point p0 with the image in A. Therefore, the mapping pi is continuous and the
set αP + (1− α)q is closed being the image of the compact set P .
Let R0 be a subset of R such that P ⊆ R0 and R0 is closed under convex115
combinations (3). Suppose there is a decision maker’s preference relation  on
R0.
Some structural assumptions should be imposed on Σ. First, assume that
Σ contains the singleton subset {x} for each x ∈ X. Denote δx the one-point
measure: δx ({x}) = 1. A set A ⊆ X is a preference interval if x, y ∈ A120
implies {z ∈ X : δx  δz  δy} ⊆ A. The second assumption is that Σ contains
all preference intervals.
Consider the following properties.
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1. (Weak Order) The relation (,R0) is complete and transitive.
2. (Continuity) For any P,Q ∈ R0 and r ∈ P the sets {α : αP + (1− α) r  Q}125
and {α : Q  αP + (1− α) r} are closed.
3. (Independence) For any p, q, r ∈ P and α ∈ (0; 1) if p  q, then αp+ (1−
α)r  αq + (1− α)r.
4. (Dominance) For any p, q, r ∈ P and A ∈ Σ
if p(A) = 1 and q  δx for any x ∈ A, then q  p;130
if p(A) = 1 and δx  r for any x ∈ A, then p  r;
5. (Monotonicity) For any P ∈ R0 and q ∈ P if q  p for any p ∈ P , then
q  P .
6. (Preference for Stochastic Risk) P  12P + 12p for any P ∈ R0 and p ∈ P .
Weak Order assumption is common. To understand assumptions 2 and 6,135
let us interpret convex combination (3) as a “two-step lottery” similarly to con-
vex combinations of measures in the expected utility theory (see Appendix B).
Here Continuity axiom of the expected utility theory is extended to convex
combinations of regularities, while the Independence axiom is left unchanged.
Dominance axiom is used to obtain the expected utility representation for non-140
simple probability measures. Note that the latter two assumptions refer only to
preferences among measures. Monotonicity axiom links the preference relation
on regularities with the one on probability measures. Assumption 6 should be
understood as follows: the decision maker would not refuse a 50-50 chance to
exchange the nonstochastic outcome described by a regularity P for a stochastic145
outcome described by a probability measure p ∈ P , i.e. to reduce nonstochastic
risk to stochastic. Compare this with Uncertainty Aversion axiom of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989) and Principle of Guaranteed Result in Ivanenko and
Labkovsky (1986).
Our main result is the following.150
Theorem 2. The preference relation (,R0) satisfies assumptions 1 – 6 if and
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only if there exists a utility function U : R0 → R of the form
U(P ) = min
p∈P
∫
u(x) dp, P ∈ R0, (4)
where u : X → R is a bounded measurable function. Furthermore, the mapping
V : R0 → R is also a utility function of the form (4) if and only if there are
a, b ∈ R, a > 0, such that V (P ) = aU(P ) + b.
Proof. Due to assumptions 1, 2, and 3 the induced preference relation (,P)
satisfies the Herstein and Milnor (1953) conditions. Therefore, there exists a
linear utility function U : P → R, which is unique up to a positive linear trans-
formation. Assumption 4 of Fishburn (1982) implies that there is a bounded
measurable function u : X → R such that
U (p) =
∫
u(x) dp
for all p ∈ P.
Fix an arbitrary P ∈ R0. Since the mapping U is continuous on the compact
set P , it follows that there exists p0 ∈ P such that
U (p0) = min
p∈P
U (p) .
Then assumption 5 implies p0  P . On the other hand, by assumption 6 we have
P  12P + 12p0. Since p0 ∈ 12P + 12p0, the repeated application of assumption
6 gives 12P +
1
2p0  14P + 34p0. Continuing in the same way, we obtain the
sequence of regularities such that
P  1
2n
P +
(
1− 1
2n
)
p0.
Since 12n → 0 as n → ∞, from assumption 2 it follows that P  p0. Now put155
U (P ) = U (p0) and extend U to R0. Obviously, U is a utility function of the
form (4).
The necessity of assumptions 2 and 6 follows from the linearity of U , i.e.
U (αP + (1− α) q) = αU (P ) + (1− α)U (q)
for all P ∈ R0, q ∈ P, and α ∈ [0, 1].
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4. Conclusion
Theorem 2 provides an axiomatic foundation of the maxmin expected utility160
rule for decision problems under nonstochastic risk. In such problems the choice
is made among weak* closed sets of probability measures.1 This reflects the fact
that a random phenomenon is generally described by a specific set of probability
distributions (Theorem 1). If a random phenomenon is stochastic and the set of
outcomes is finite, then this set is a singleton. Correspondingly, if R0 = P, then165
Theorem 2 degenerates into the expected utility theorem of von Neumann and
Morgenstern. The main assumption that we use is the following: the decision
maker wishes to reduce the set of probability distributions to a single one.
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Appendix A
The proof of Theorem 1 rests on the following general lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose Y is a compact space, f : Y → Rm is a continuous mapping,
and {xn} is a sequence in Y . Then
LIM {f(xn)} = f (LIM {xn}) ,
where by LIM {xn} we denote the set of limit points of a sequence {xn}.175
Proof. Suppose x ∈ LIM {xn} and y = f(x). For any neighborhood B of y
there exists a neighborhood A of x such that f(A) ⊆ B. Since the sequence
1Some decision makers may think of averaging a statistical regularity to a single distribution
and then calculating vNM expected utility.
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{xn} infinitely many times hits A, it follows that the same is true for {f(xn)}
and B. Hence, y ∈ LIM {f(xn)}.
If y ∈ LIM {f(xn)}, then f (xnk) → y as k → ∞ for some subsequence180
{xnk}. From compactness of X it follows that the sequence {xnk} has a limit
point x ∈ LIM {xn}. Let us assume that ‖f(x)− y‖ = ε > 0. Then starting
from some k0 ∈ N we have ‖f(xnk)− y‖ < ε2 . On the other hand, the ε2 -
neighborhood of the point f(x) contains the image of some neighborhood A of
x. Since there is an xnk in A after k0, we arrive at a contradiction. Therefore,185
f(x) = y.
Proof of Theorem 1. 1) Let the sequence {pn} correspond to x¯ in the sense of
(1) and piγ : P → Rm be defined by
piγ(p) =
∫
γ(x) dp.
Since the mapping piγ is continuous, the application of Lemma 3 yields
LIM {piγ(pn)} = piγ (LIM {pn}) .
By rewriting both sides of the previous equation
piγ(pn) =
∫
γ(x) dpn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
γ (xi) = yn
LIM {pn} = P (x¯)
we obtain
LIM {yn} = piγ (P (x¯)) .
2) Assume that the sequences x¯(1) and x¯(2) are S-equivalent and there exists a
point p0 ∈ P
(
x¯(1)
) \ P (x¯(2)). Since P (x¯(2)) is closed, there is a neighborhood
A of p0 such that P
(
x¯(2)
) ∩ A = ∅. Equivalently, there exist a real number
ε > 0 and bounded measurable functions fi : X → R (i = 1,m) such that for
any p ∈ P (x¯(2)) we have
∣∣∫ fi(x) dp− ∫ fi(x) dp0∣∣ ≥ ε
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for some i ∈ 1,m. If γ = (f1, . . . , fm), then the vector
∫
γ(x) dp0 is not in{∫
γ(x) dp : p ∈ P (x¯(2))} .
Hence, the first part of the theorem implies that the sequences x¯(1) and x¯(2) are
not S-equivalent, which is a contradiction. Therefore, P
(
x¯(1)
)
= P
(
x¯(2)
)
.
The converse follows from the first part of the theorem.
Appendix B190
Suppose P ∈ R is the statistical regularity of a phenomenon A and q ∈ P
is the statistical regularity of a phenomenon B. The phenomenon C is repre-
sented by the following sampling net ϕ : Λ → X∞: for all λ ∈ Λ before each
observation there is a chance α to observe A and a complementary chance to
observe B. By rλ denote the frequency distribution of a sample ϕλ. If the
sample is big enough, then approximately α percentage of observations belongs
to A. This observations constitute the sample from A with some distribution
pλ. Similarly, by qλ denote the distribution of observations that belong to B.
Then the following equalities hold (the first holds approximately):
rλ = αpλ + (1− α) qλ, P = LIM (pλ) , q = LIM (qλ) .
The following lemma implies that the statistical regularity LIM (rλ) of the phe-
nomenon C coincides with αP + (1− α) q.
Lemma 4. If Λ is a directed set, pλ, qλ ∈ P for all λ ∈ Λ, α ∈ [0, 1], and
LIM (qλ) is a singleton, then
LIM (αpλ + (1− α) qλ) = αLIM (pλ) + (1− α) LIM (qλ) .
Proof. Let us fix p ∈ LIM (pλ), q ∈ LIM (qλ), λ0 ∈ Λ, and show that αpλ +
(1− α) qλ is in the (f1, . . . , fn, ε)-neighborhood of αp+(1− α) q for some λ ≥ λ0.
Since P is compact, it follows that q is a limit of the net (qλ) and there exists
λ1 ∈ Λ such that for all λ ≥ λ1 the probability qλ is in the (f1, . . . , fn, ε)-
neighborhood of q. On the other hand, there exists λ2 ∈ Λ such that λ2 ≥ λ0,
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λ2 ≥ λ1, and pλ2 is in the (f1, . . . , fn, ε)-neighborhood of p. Then∣∣∫ fi(x) d (αp+ (1− α) q)− ∫ fi(x) d (αpλ2 + (1− α) qλ2)∣∣
≤ α ∣∣∫ fi(x) dp− ∫ fi(x) dpλ2 ∣∣
+ (1− α) ∣∣∫ fi(x) dq − ∫ fi(x) dqλ2 ∣∣ < ε
for each i = 1, n.
To prove the converse inclusion, take r ∈ LIM (αpλ + (1− α) qλ). Let M be
the directed set of pairs (λ,A), such that λ ∈ Λ, A is a neighborhood of r, and
αpλ + (1− α) qλ ∈ A. By definition, (λ1, A1) ≥ (λ0, A0) if and only if λ1 ≥ λ0
and A1 ⊆ A0. For each µ ∈M put
rµ = αpλ + (1− α) qλ, pµ = pλ, qµ = qλ
when µ = (λ,A). Clearly, (rµ), (pµ), and (qµ) are subnets of (αpλ + (1− α) qλ),
(pλ), and (qλ) respectively. Moreover, lim (rµ) = r. Since P is compact, it195
follows that (pµ) has a limit point p ∈ LIM (pλ). We will show that r =
αp+ (1− α) q.
For any µ ≥ µ1 rµ is in the (f, ε)-neighborhood of r and qµ is in the (f, ε)-
neighborhood of q. On the other hand, there is a µ2 ≥ µ1 such that pµ2 is in
the (f, ε)-neighborhood of p. Then
∣∣∫ f(x) dr − ∫ f(x) d (αp+ (1− α) q)∣∣
≤ ∣∣∫ f(x) dr − ∫ f(x) d (rµ2)∣∣
+
∣∣∫ f(x) d (αpµ2 + (1− α) qµ2)− ∫ f(x) d (αp+ (1− α) q)∣∣
< ε+ αε+ (1− α) ε = 2ε.
Since f and ε are arbitrary, we have r = αp+ (1− α) q.
13
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